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Fishery share systems and ITQ markets: who should pay for quota?
Abstract Although, in most commercial sheries, shing crews are remunerated under a
share system, the implications of share systems for ITQ markets have received relatively
little attention. In this paper we explore the impact of extending crew shares of vessel
operating costs to include the cost of quota. We nd that e¢ ciency is maintained as long
as any share system is adopted across the entire eet. Making crews pay a share of quota
costs, however, simply inates the quota price at their expense: at market equilibrium
the vessel owners total prot share is una¤ected. We also consider the outcome if only
net purchasers of quota involve crews in the cost of quota. Here, all vessel owners benet,
while all crews see a reduction in their earnings. These results are illustrated with a
simple numerical example. The implications for resource rent capture policies are briey
considered.
Keywords: sheries; ITQs; quota markets; share payments; resource rent
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1. Introduction
In many, if not most, commercial sheries, shing crews are rewarded under a share or
laysystem (e.g., Sutinen, 1979; Anderson, 1982; McConnell and Price, 2006). Despite
this, economic models of the shery tend either to treat labour costs in a similar way to
other variable costs, i.e., as related to harvest or shing e¤ort, or to assume (implicitly
at least) that labour is paid a xed wage. If instead there is a share system of crew
remuneration, and if the owners of shing vessels make decisions based solely upon their
shares of the costs and benets to the rm, this may have signicant implications for
economic outcomes in the shery.
A case in point is the use of ITQs (individual transferable quotas) in sheries manage-
ment. ITQ systems are now widely employed in commercial sheries in order to achieve
e¢ cient regulation of harvest rates. Whereas, in almost all such sheries, crews are re-
munerated using a share system, it is common for quota costs to be borne entirely by the
vessel owner, as in Iceland and Australia, for example. Elsewhere, the fact that the costs
of quota leasing appear as additional nancial costs to individual rms has led to a prac-
tice of sharing quota costs between owner and crew, along with other variable operating
costs. This is now the norm in the UK, for example, where revenues and operating costs
(including the costs of quota leasing) are generally split 50:50 between owner and crew.1
It is not immediately clear, however, what consequences this will have for the economic
performance of the eet and for the earnings of vessel owners and their crews.
1 Although the UK does not have a formal ITQ system as such, the arrangements for devolved quota management
allow a signicant amount of quota trading to take place in practice, particularly in the in-year (lease) market.
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The central aim of this paper is to examine the implications of sharing the cost of quota
for the generation and distribution of economic prots in an ITQ shery. Although there
is a large theoretical literature on ITQs, few authors have considered the implications
of share payments for the properties of ITQ markets. Anderson (1999) examines the
long run e¢ ciency of the eet under an ITQ system when the crew are paid on a share
basis, concluding that full long run e¢ ciency can only be achieved if the vessel owner and
the crew have equal shares of both quota costs and what we will refer to as operating
prots (revenues minus non-labour variable costs). If owners pay all the quota costs,
long run e¢ ciency cannot be achieved, it is held, since individual vessels harvest too little
and the eet will be too large as a consequence. Hannesson (2000) nds that the vessel
owners decision to invest in ITQs under a share system is distorted if a share of prots
is paid to the crew, and argues that over-investment in physical capital may occur as a
result. McConnell and Price (2006) consider the allocative e¢ ciency of ITQs with a share
system and show that the quota market will be ine¢ cient if the owners shares of revenues
and non-labour harvesting costs are di¤erent. In these analyses, only Anderson (1999)
explicitly considers the relationship between the share rate and the price at which quota is
traded between vessels, but he does so in the context of a long run industrial equilibrium,
with adjustments in both eet and stock size, and with the same shares pertaining for
both quota costs and operating prots throughout.
Our focus in the present paper is rather di¤erent. We are interested here in the relative
share rates for quota costs and operating prots, rather than the share rate per se, and
the impact these have on economic prots and the quota price, as well as the earnings by
4
owner and crew. We nd that the equilibrium quota price is sensitive to the di¤erence
between the owners share of operating prots and his share of quota costs. While this
may not be unexpected, what is perhaps less intuitive is that changes in the owners share
of the cost of quota have no e¤ect upon his total prot share when shares are the same
across the entire eet. All the impacts of resultant changes in the quota price are felt
by the crew, who experience a loss or gain in income as a result. We also examine a
situation in which net sellers of quota are reluctant to share quota income with the crew,
while net purchasers of quota share their quota costs. Here we nd that both categories
of vessel owner are better o¤ under a sharing arrangement, whereas both crews see a loss
in income.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up a basic model of a shing rm in an
ITQ market with crew shares. The implications of crew shares of quota costs are then
explored in the following two sections, rstly assuming that shares are the same for all
vessels in the eet and then assuming that only net purchasers of quota share quota costs.
Section 5 provides a numerical illustration of the results, while a nal section concludes.
2. A shing rm model with ITQs and crew shares
For a representative shing vessel rm in an ITQ shery, total short run prots as a
function of harvest qi and quota demand Qi are given by
Bi (qi)  r

Qi   Qi

; (1)
where r is the quota rental (lease) price and Qi  0 is the rms initial quota endowment
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(or, equivalently, the quantity of quota held by the rm as a capital asset). The social
benet (or operating prots) function Bi (qi) is simply dened as
Bi (qi)  pqi   ci (qi) ; (2)
where p is the market price for output and ci (qi) are (non-labour) variable harvesting
costs. As is usual, we assume convex costs, so that c00i (qi) > 0 and hence B
00
i (qi) < 0.
Let the vessel owners shares of operating prots and quota lease costs be given by 0 <
i < 1 and 0 < i  1 respectively. The crews shares of operating prots and quota
costs are therefore 0 < [1  i] < 1 and 0  [1  i] < 1. Assuming quota compliance,
the owners prot maximisation problem is then
max
q;Q
oi  iBi (qi)  ir

Qi   Qi

s:t: qi  0; Qi  0; Qi  qi: (3)
From the rst order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for a solution to (3), it is straightforward
to nd the owners optimal decision rule for qi = Q

i > 0 as
B0i (q

i ) =
i
i
r; (4)
where B0i (q

i )  p c0i (qi ). Note that, if i = i, this expression is identical to the decision
rule for the owner of a rm whose labour costs are parametric.
Clearly, for marginal social benets (and hence marginal social costs) to be equated across
all rms in the shery, we require either i = i for all rms, or, if i 6= i, the shares i
and i to be the same for each rm. Otherwise, the quota allocation will not be e¢ cient
(except by chance). Notice that, where i 6= i, e¢ ciency does not depend upon the
values of shares i and i per se, only on whether they have the same values for every
vessel in the eet. We return to this in the next section.
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In order to examine the quota market implications of di¤erent share arrangements, we go
on to consider two scenarios: rstly, one in which any change in the owners quota share
relative to his share of operating prots occurs across all vessels simultaneously; secondly,
one in which a change in the owners quota share a¤ects only some vessels in the eet.
3. Crew shares are the same for all rms
To begin with, we assume that at market equilibrium the shares i and i are the same
across all vessels in the eet. We can therefore treat a single vessel as a model for the
entire eet.2
Suppose we have  >  and hence, from equation (4), B0 (q) > r. This implies that
the equilibrium quota price is less than the marginal benet of harvest to the rm. Not
surprisingly, if the owner bears a disproportionately large share of the cost of quota, quota
is traded at below its marginal value to the rm as a whole. If  < , on the other hand,
then B0 (q) < r and quota is overvalued with respect to its marginal benet to the rm.
Totally di¤erentiating (4) and rearranging, we can obtain an expression for the slope of
the owners quota demand curve as
dQ (r)
dr
=
dq (r)
dr
=


B00 1 () < 0; (5)
where B00 1 () is the slope of the inverse of B0 (q).3 All else equal, the greater is the
owners share  in the cost of quota, the more (price) elastic is his demand for quota and
2 Individual subscripts are accordingly dropped for this section.
3 We assume that, for all q  0, the function B0 (q) has an inverse B0 1 (). By the inverse
function rule, we then have B00 1 ()  1=B00 (q).
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hence the lower is his quota demand at any given quota price. As a result, the industry
inverse quota demand will become less elastic as  increases and more elastic as  is
reduced, relative to . For a given total quota supply (TAC), therefore, the equilibrium
quota price is reduced if  >  and increased if  < . Changes in both  and  which
leave the ratio = unaltered, on the other hand, will have no e¤ect upon quota demands
and hence the equilibrium quota price.
Notice that  6=  in expression (4) implies that total rm prots are not maximised by
the vessel owner. From (1) we would expect total prots for both owner and crew to be
maximised where B0 (q) = r. If, instead, the rm operates where B0 (q) > r for example,
it appears to underproduce for the observed quota price. But in this case, as we have
seen, the equilibrium quota price will be lower than it would be if all rms set B0 (q) = r.
All else equal, if the quota market clears then output for the representative rm must be
unchanged by a change in  and hence a change in the quota price r. Therefore, total
economic prots will be una¤ected by an increase or a decrease in : there is simply a
concomitant reduction or increase in the value of quota.
In order to examine this further, let ~r be the equilibrium quota price when ~ = 1 > .
Then from (4) we have
B0 (q)j> =
~

~r =
1

~r: (6)
If we reduce  from  = 1 to  = , holding  constant, then we will have
B0 (q)j= =


r = r: (7)
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If there is no change in the output of the representative rm, then
B0 (q)j> = B0 (q)j= (8)
and therefore
r =
1

~r; (9)
which implies that r > ~r. Assume that the rm is a net purchaser of quota, i.e., Q > Q.
When ~ = 1, the cost to the owner of a unit of quota is ~~r = ~r. If  is reduced to  = ,
the owners unit quota costs are now r. But, if  is unchanged, we can observe that
r = 
1

~r = ~r: (10)
Hence, if q = Q has not changed, the owners quota costs have not changed! Since there
has also been no change in the owners share of operating prots B (q), we can see that
making the crew pay a share of the quota costs merely inates the quota price at their
expense: at market equilibrium there is no net gain to the vessel owner.
We get the opposite result if  is increased from  =  < 1 to  = 1, again holding 
constant. Now, if the rm is a net purchaser of quota, we will see a reduction in the
equilibrium quota price and an increase in crew remuneration: a transfer from the total
cost of quota to the total earnings of the crew.
It is relatively straightforward to show that if the rm is a net seller of quota (and we
assume that the income from quota leasing is shared pro rata with the crew - see below)
then the impacts on crew remuneration from a change in  are simply reversed. Thus, all
else equal, an increase in  implies a reduction in both total quota income and total crew
remuneration, while a reduction in  implies an increase in total quota income and crew
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remuneration. At market equilibrium, therefore, sharing the income from quota leasing
with the crew has no negative impact on the owners prots.
In each case, although the total value of quota changes with changes in  relative to ,
the total economic prots in the shery remain unchanged since, with  and  the same
across the eet, the allocation of quota continues to be e¢ cient.
4. Crew quota shares di¤er across vessels
Although sharing the cost of quota with the crew has no impact upon the owners total
share of the prots (operating prots less quota costs, or plus quota income) when all
vessel rms behave similarly, there is clearly a temptation for vessel owners who are net
sellers of quota to retain a 100% share of quota income. We therefore examine the quota
market outcome if only net buyers of quota reduce the owners quota share i.
Consider a shery consisting of just two representative (price-taking) vessels. Although
we will assume that the vessels are otherwise identical, the quota endowments Qi are
such, we assume, that Vessel 1 leases quota to Vessel 2. Let the initial quota shares be
i = 1 > i; i = 1; 2, the same for both vessels. To begin with, therefore, both vessels
operate where
B0i (q

i ) =
1
i
r; i = 1; 2: (11)
Now consider what happens if Vessel 2, a net purchaser of quota, reduces 2 to 2 = 2 <
1. The industry equilibrium quota price must increase, since Vessel 2s quota demand will
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become less elastic as a result. Because Vessel 1s decision rule stays the same as (11), its
output is reduced in response to the increased quota price and hence it leases more quota
to Vessel 2, which therefore expands its output. Note that Vessel 2 now operates where
B02 (q

2) =
2
2
r = r; (12)
and therefore B02 (q

2) < B
0
1 (q

1), which, if the vessels are identical, conrms that now
q2 > q

1. The result is nevertheless robust to asymmetry in the eet, as the numerical
example in Section 5 will demonstrate.
In the new market equilibrium, Vessel 1s owner benets from increased quota leasing
at an increased quota price, although his share of operating prots is reduced as the
vessels output is reduced. Employing the Envelope Theorem, however, we can see from
the Lagrangian for (3) that
do1
dr
=  1

Q1   Q1

> 0; (13)
which is unambiguously positive for a net seller of quota. Vessel 1s crew, on the other
hand, clearly lose out since they only get a share of operating prots, which are reduced.
Vessel 2 increases its output and hence total operating prots, and both the owners and
the crews shares of operating prots are therefore increased. While total quota costs are
increased, these are now split between the owner and the crew. From
do2
d2
=  r Q2   Q2 < 0; (14)
however, we can see that, given Q2 > Q2, the owner of Vessel 2 will always derive a net
benet from a reduction in 2. Since the total crew remuneration (prot share) for Vessel
2 is given by
c2  [1  2]B2 (q2)  [1  2] r

Q2   Q2

; (15)
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we can nd
dc2
d2
= [[1  2]B02 (q2) + 2r]
dq2
d2
+ r

Q2   Q2

; (16)
which uses Q2 = q

2. Given that the vessel owner ensures that 2B
0
2 (q

2) = 2r, this
reduces to
dc2
d2
= B02 (q

2)
dq2
d2
+ r

Q2   Q2

R 0: (17)
As the rst term on the RHS is negative and the second term is positive, the sign of this
expression appears ambiguous. However, since the change in crew income from a marginal
change in 2 is related to the marginal change in operating prots but the total cost of
quota, we can conclude that the second term dominates and hence that the sign of (17) is
positive. Thus, a reduction in 2 leads to a net reduction in crew remuneration for Vessel
2.
Finally, notice that while the total value of quota increases, the total economic prot in
the shery will decrease, since the allocation of quota is now ine¢ cient.
5. A numerical example
We illustrate the above using a simple numerical example with just two vessels in the
eet. To give a specic functional form to (3), let
oi  i

pqi   1
2
ciq
2
i

  ir

Qi   Qi

; i = 1; 2: (18)
The rst order conditions for the vessel ownersoptimal choices of qi = Q

i are then
i [p  ciqi ] = ir; i = 1; 2: (19)
Solving for r, and substituting using Q  Q1 + Q2 = Q1 + Q2, we can employ a little
12
manipulation to nd
Q1 = q

1 =
p

1
1
  2
2

+
2
2
c2Q
1
1
c1 +
2
2
c2
; (20)
together with a similar expression for Q2, as well as
r =
p
1
1
[c1 + c2]  1
1
c1c2Q
1
1
 2
2
c1 + c2
: (21)
Given the parameters p and Qi as well as the cost coe¢ cients ci, we can then calculate
the equilibrium quota market outcomes for any combination of the shares i and i.
Let p = 10, Q1 = 100 and Q2 = 20, with c1 = 0:1 and c2 = 0:05. Notice that we have now
relaxed the assumption that the vessels are identical, since here Vessel 2 is clearly more
e¢ cient than Vessel 1, although its initial quota endowment is smaller.
Table I shows the quota market outcome when 1 = 2 = 0:5 and 1 = 2 = 1. Vessel 1
leases 60 units of quota to Vessel 2 at an equilibrium price of 3. Total economic prots
in the shery are 960, of which 360 is captured in the value of quota. In Table II, we
show the results when both i shares are reduced to equal the i shares. Notice that the
(e¢ cient) quota allocation is unchanged, as are the total economic prots in the shery.
Now, however, the value of quota is doubled and the impact of this is entirely felt by the
crew. The crew of Vessel 1 more than double their income (from 160 to 340) while the
crew of Vessel 2 see their total remuneration reduced from 320 to 140.
Table III shows the outcome when only Vessel 2 reduces 2 to equal 2, while Vessel
1 retains 1 = 1. Compared to the outcome in Table I, we can see that although the
total value of quota is increased, total prots in the shery are reduced since the quota
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allocation is now ine¢ cient. The owner of Vessel 1 gains as a result of the increased
leasing of quota to Vessel 2, but Vessel 1s crew lose out. As predicted, there is also a net
gain for the owner of Vessel 2, while the crew of Vessel 2 su¤er a net loss in income.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that, all else equal, changes in the share of quota costs paid by the vessel
owner, when applied across the whole eet, have an impact upon the equilibrium quota
price but do not change the owners total prot share. The e¤ects of changes in the quota
price fall entirely upon the crew, who gain or lose a share of prots as a result. We have
also seen that the e¢ ciency of quota allocation is maintained as long as the ownersshares
of quota costs and operating prots are consistent across the eet: there is no requirement
for these shares to be equal.
Given this, if the xed (capital) costs of the vessel are covered by the owners share of
the total prots, as is usually the case, there appear to be no implications for long run
e¢ ciency if there are changes across the eet in the owners share of quota costs. A
positive crew reservation wage on the other hand, which represents a quasi-xed cost to
be covered by the crew share of operating prots, may impose an upper limit on the
percentage of quota costs which can be borne by the crew.
If only some vessel owners share quota costs with the crew (and we assumed that net
sellers of quota might be reluctant to do so) we saw that quota allocation would no longer
be e¢ cient and that total economic prots in the shery would be reduced as a result.
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Nevertheless, the equilibrium quota price would still increase, and all vessel owners would
benet at the expense of their crews.
Although there seems to be a widespread reluctance on behalf of the governments of
shing nations to attempt to extract resource rents from the industry, a share system
which e¤ectively increases the proportion of economic prots which are reected in the
value of quota has interesting implications for rent capture policies (see, for example,
Grafton, 1992; 1995). At the very least, the generation of resource rents in the shery is
more accurately measured than in a share shery where crew do not share in the cost of
quota, since a part of the resource rent paid to the crew is now transferred to the value
of quota. In consequence, a tax on quota value has the potential to capture a greater
proportion of resource rents.
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Vessel 1 Vessel 2
1 = 0:5 1 = 1:0 Q

1 = 40 2 = 0:5 2 = 1:0 Q

2 = 80
Total Owner Crew Total Owner Crew
B (qi ) 320 160 160 640 320 320
 r Qi   Qi 180 180 0  180  180 0
B (qi )  r

Qi   Qi

500 340 160 460 140 320
P2
i=1B (q

i ) = 960 r = 3
Table I.
Vessel 1 Vessel 2
1 = 0:5 1 = 0:5 Q

1 = 40 2 = 0:5 2 = 0:5 Q

2 = 80
Total Owner Crew Total Owner Crew
B (qi ) 320 160 160 640 320 320
 r Qi   Qi 360 180 180  360  180  180
B (qi )  r

Qi   Qi

680 340 340 280 140 140
P2
i=1B (q

i ) = 960 r = 6
Table II.
Vessel 1 Vessel 2
1 = 0:5 1 = 1:0 Q

1 = 10 2 = 0:5 2 = 0:5 Q

2 = 110
Total Owner Crew Total Owner Crew
B (qi ) 95 47:5 47:5 797:5 398:75 398:75
 r Qi   Qi 405 405 0  405  202:5  202:5
B (qi )  r

Qi   Qi

500 452:5 47:5 392:5 196:25 196:25
P2
i=1B (q

i ) = 892:5 r = 4:5
Table III.
